The operation was supposed to ensure a quick and unconditional victory of fascist Germany over the USSR due to the surprise factor. However, despite the preparations in secrecy, the Barbarossa plan failed, and the war of the Germans with domestic troops dragged on and lasted from 1941 to 1945, after which it ended in the defeat of Germany.
Plan "Barbarossa" got its name in honor of the medieval King of Germany, Frederick 1, who was a glorious commander and, as was previously believed, planned raids on Russia in the 12th century. Later, this myth was debunked.
The content of the plan "Barbarossa" and its significance
The attack on the USSR was to be Germany's next step towards world domination. The victory over Russia and the conquest of its territories should have opened up for Hitler the opportunity to enter into an open clash with the United States for the right to redistribute the world. Having managed to conquer almost all of Europe, Hitler was confident in his unconditional victory over the USSR.
In order for the attack to go smoothly, it was necessary to develop a plan for a military attack. That plan was Barbarossa. Before planning the attack, Hitler ordered his intelligence officers to collect detailed information about the Soviet army and its weapons. After analyzing the information received, Hitler decided that the German army was significantly superior to the Red Army of the USSR - based on this, they began to plan the attack.
The essence of the Barbarossa plan was to strike at the Red Army suddenly, on its own territory and, taking advantage of the unpreparedness of the troops and the technical superiority of the German army, conquer the USSR within two and a half months.
At first, it was planned to conquer the front line located on the territory of Belarus by wedging German detachments from different sides of the Soviet army. The disunited and unprepared Red Army had to surrender quickly. Then Hitler was going to move towards Kyiv in order to conquer the territory of Ukraine and, most importantly, its sea routes and cut off the paths of Soviet troops. Thus, he could enable his troops to further attack the USSR from the south and north. In parallel, Hitler's army was to launch an offensive from Norway. Surrounding the USSR on all sides, Hitler planned to move on Moscow.
However, already at the very beginning of the war, the German command realized that the plans began to crumble.
Operation Barbarossa and results
Hitler's first and main mistake was that he underestimated the strength and armament of the Soviet army, which, according to historians, was superior to the German one in some areas. In addition, the war was on the territory of the Russian army, so the soldiers easily navigated the terrain and could fight in different natural conditions, which was not so easy for the Germans. Another distinctive feature of the Russian army, which greatly influenced the failure of the Barbarossa operation, was the ability of Russian soldiers to mobilize in the shortest possible time to fight back, which did not allow the army to be divided into scattered detachments.
Hitler set before his troops the task of quickly penetrating deep into the Soviet army and dividing it, not allowing the Russian soldiers to carry out major operations as it could be dangerous. The plan was to split the Soviet army and force it to flee. However, the opposite happened. Hitler's troops quickly penetrated deep into the Russian troops, but they could not conquer the flanks and defeat the army too. The Germans tried to follow the plan and surrounded the Russian detachments, but this did not lead to any results - the Russians quickly got out of the encirclement thanks to the surprisingly clear and competent leadership of their commanders. As a result, despite the fact that Hitler's army still won, it happened very slowly, which ruined the whole plan for a swift conquest.
On the approaches to Moscow, Hitler's army was no longer so strong. Exhausted by endless battles that dragged on for a long time, the army could not go on to conquer the capital, in addition, the bombing of Moscow never began, although according to Hitler's plans, by this time the city should not have been on the map. The same thing happened with Leningrad, which was taken under blockade, but never surrendered, and was not destroyed from the air.
The operation, which was planned as a swift victorious attack, turned into a protracted war and stretched from two months to several years.
Reasons for the failure of the Barbarossa plan
The main reasons for the failure of the operation can be considered:
- The lack of accurate data on the combat power of the Russian army. Hitler and his command underestimated the capabilities of the Soviet soldiers, which led to the creation of an incorrect offensive and battle plan. The Russians gave a strong rebuff, which the Germans did not count on;
- Excellent counterintelligence. Unlike the Germans, the Russians were able to establish intelligence well, thanks to which the command was almost always aware of the next step of the enemy and could adequately respond to it. The Germans failed to play on the element of surprise;
- Difficult areas. It was difficult for Hitler's troops to get maps of the Soviet terrain, in addition, they were not used to fighting in such conditions (unlike the Russians), so very often impenetrable forests and swamps helped the Soviet army to leave and deceive the enemy;
- Lack of control over the course of the war. The German command already in the first few months lost control over the course of hostilities, the Barbarossa plan turned out to be unfeasible, and the Red Army conducted a skillful counteroffensive.
Contrary to German expectations, Great Britain was not ready to enter into peace negotiations even after the defeat of France in June 1940. Since the German air raids did not bring the expected result, and the attack on the island state looked too risky, the German strategic concept had to be changed. Preference was given to the final goal of the war - the destruction of the Soviet Union and the achievement of colonial domination over the entire Eastern Europe in order to achieve victory over Great Britain in this way.
After various preliminary studies, on 12/18/1940, Hitler instructed to prepare an attack on Soviet Union("Plan Barbarossa"). Only a small part of the German military and diplomats warned Hitler against this war, while the majority agreed with his goals and hoped for a quick victory. The optimistic authors of the plan intended to achieve the intended goal, the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, within eight weeks by a "blitzkrieg", the more cautious ones - within sixteen weeks. The military formations intended to attack the Soviet Union numbered 3.3 million soldiers, which roughly corresponded to their numbers in the war against France. True, they were better equipped and more experienced militarily. These included the Allied troops (Romania, Finland) numbering about 600,000 people. After talking to Hitler about a week before the attack, Goebbels expressed the general anticipation of victory: "We are facing an unparalleled victorious campaign."
When preparing the "war of world views" against the Soviet Union, something more was meant than military-technical planning. At the meeting of the commanders on March 30, 1941, Hitler left no doubt that it was a "struggle for annihilation." “The fight will be very different from the fight in the West. Cruelty in the East is soft for the future.” Accordingly, the military directives (Gen Hoepner's Fourth Panzer Group) stated that the war against Russia was to be waged "with unheard-of cruelty". The High Command of the Wehrmacht already in March 1941 announced its agreement that the Reichsfuehrer SS would "independently and under personal responsibility" carry out the "special tasks of the Fuhrer" in the combat area of the ground forces. For actions against "enemy civilians," the decree on the conduct of military proceedings of May 13, 1941, said, "there will be no mandatory prosecution, even if the act is a war crime or misdemeanor." "Order on commissars" dated 6.6.1941, the destruction of political workers of the Soviet Army was authorized. In the plans for economic activity and food supply in the occupied regions, starvation was provided for many millions of people: “At the same time, tens of millions of people will undoubtedly starve” (meeting of secretaries of state on May 2, 1941). “Several tens of millions of people in this territory will become superfluous and die or will be forced to move to Siberia.” ("Economic Headquarters Ost" dated 23.5.1941).
The Soviet leadership had, at the latest in May 1941, reliable information about the German attack. But the Red Army was not ready for war: neither its personnel, nor in organizational terms. Apparently, the Soviet leadership was unable to make a clear decision: although the troops were pulled up to the borders, they were not in a position to launch a counterattack and did not have a realistic defensive concept.
Text 25
Entries from the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Halder dated 30.3.1941 regarding the goals of the war against the Soviet Union and its conduct.
War of two worldviews. An annihilating sentence to Bolshevism as an anti-social bunch of criminals. Communism is a terrible danger to the future. We must abandon the idea of a soldier's camaraderie. The communist was not and never will be a comrade. It's about fighting for destruction. If we do not accept this, then, although we will defeat the enemy, in 30 years we will again be confronted by the communist enemy. We are not waging war to conserve the enemy. Future picture of the state: Northern Russia belongs to Finland. Protectorates - the Baltic countries, Ukraine, Belarus. The struggle against Russia: the destruction of the Bolshevik commissars and the Bolshevik intelligentsia. [...] The struggle must be waged in order to destroy the poison of decay. This is not a question of military courts. The leaders of the troops must know what is at stake. They must lead the fight. Troops must defend themselves with the same means with which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU officers are criminals, and they must be dealt with accordingly.
Therefore, the troops should not get out of the power of the leaders. The leader must take his orders in accordance with the mood in the troops. The fight will be very different from the fight in the West. In the East cruelty is soft for the future. Leaders must demand self-sacrifice from themselves, overcome their doubts.
Text 26
Directives of the High Command of the Wehrmacht of 13. 3. 1941 regarding the management of the occupied areas and cooperation with the SS.
2) [...]
B) in the area of operations of the ground forces, the Reichsfuehrer SS receives special tasks from the Fuhrer for the preparation of the political administration, which follow from the struggle of two opposing political systems, leading to a victorious end. Within the framework of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS acts independently and under his own responsibility. As for the rest, the administrative power transferred to the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces and the services authorized by him does not require intervention. The Reichsfuehrer SS makes sure that the performance of his tasks does not interfere with the conduct of military operations. In more detail, this is regulated directly by the High Command of the troops and the Reichsführer SS. [...]
Chief of the Supreme
command of the Wehrmacht
Keitel
31 Hitler in the Reich Chancellery with representatives of the generals after he was awarded the rank of Field Marshal for the victory over France, September 1940. From left to right: Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group A von Rundtstaedt, Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group V von Bock, Reich Marshal Goering , Hitler, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of Army Group C Ritter von Leeb, Commander of the 12th Army, General List, Commander of the 4th Army, von Kluge, Commander of the 1st Army, General Witzleben, Commander of the 6th Army, General von Reichenau.
32 Meeting of the General Staff (1940). Participants of the meeting at the table with a map (from left to right): Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, Field Marshal Keitel, Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General von Brauchitsch, Hitler, Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Halder.
Text 27
Information about the meeting of state secretaries on May 2, 1941 on the economic goals of the war against the Soviet Union.
The place of the meeting is unknown, there is no list of participants. It is known for sure that those present were: Reichsmarschall Goering, head of the "Economy Management Headquarters Ost"; General Thomas, head of the military-economic and military-industrial department of the Wehrmacht; Lieutenant General Schubert, Chief of the "Economic Headquarters Ost"; secretaries of state Kerner (four-year plan department), Backe (ministry of food), von Hanneken (ministry of economics), Alpers (ministry of forestry). Allegedly present were Rosenberg, the future Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and General Jodl of the Wehrmacht High Command.
Memo on the results of today's meeting with the secretaries of state about the "Plan Barbarossa."
1) The war should be continued only if the entire Wehrmacht in the third year of the war is supplied with food from Russia.
2) At the same time, tens of millions of people will undoubtedly starve if we take everything we need out of the country.
3) The most important thing is the preservation and transportation of oilseed crops, oilseed cake and only then grain. The available fats and meat are intended to supply the troops.
4) The functioning of the industry should be restored only in some areas, in particular: enterprises that produce vehicles, enterprises for the production of general-purpose products (iron, etc.), textile enterprises, from enterprises for the production of armaments, only such a profile, which is not enough in Germany. Opening repair shops for troops in large numbers.
5) To secure the deep areas away from the highways, special troops need to be trained, the RAD (Reich Labor Service) or auxiliary army formations can be used. It is necessary to identify especially important areas that require protection.
33 Reichsmarschall Göring in conversation with Secretary of State Herbert Backe (undated).
Text 28
An excerpt from the directive of the Economic Headquarters Ost, Agriculture Group, dated May 23, 1941, regarding the separation of Russian industrial centers from grain zones.
It follows from this: the allocation of black earth regions should ensure for us, under any circumstances, the presence of more or less significant surpluses in these regions. As a result - the cessation of supply of the entire forest zone, including large industrial centers - Moscow and St. Petersburg. [...] From all this it follows that the German administration in this area must direct all efforts to alleviate the consequences of the famine that is undoubtedly capable of arising and to accelerate the process of naturalization. It is necessary to strive for a more intensive economic development of these areas in the sense of expanding the sown areas for potatoes and other high-yielding crops important for consumption. But this will not eliminate hunger. Several tens of millions of people in this territory will become superfluous and die or will be forced to move to Siberia. Attempts to save this population from starvation by sending surpluses from the black earth zone there can only be carried out at the cost of worsening the supply of Europe. They can undermine Germany's ability to hold out in the war and weaken the blockade strength of Germany and Europe. There should be absolute clarity on this issue.
Text 29
Decree of Hitler as Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht dated May 13, 1941 on military justice in the war with the Soviet Union.
In the text of the original, the words "Plan Barbarossa", the former designation during development, are crossed out.
Fuhrer and Supreme
commander in chief
Wehrmacht
fuehrer headquarters,
13 May 1941
Decree
on the conduct of military proceedings
and about the special actions of the troops. The military court proceedings of the Wehrmacht serve primarily to maintain discipline.
The wide extent of the zone of combat operations in the East, the form of warfare and the peculiarities of the enemy pose tasks for military courts that, during military operations, up to fixing in the occupied areas, can be solved with their small personnel only if legal proceedings are limited to the main task . [...]
Consideration of criminal cases of representatives of the Wehrmacht and civilian employees for their actions against the local population.
1. There will be no mandatory prosecution for acts against enemy civilians by members of the Wehrmacht and civilians, even if the act is a war crime or misdemeanor.
2. In considering such actions, it must be borne in mind that the defeat of 1918, the subsequent period of suffering for the German people and the struggle against National Socialism with countless bloody victims of the movement, is largely due to Bolshevik influence, and not a single German has forgotten this.
3. The judge decides whether in such cases a disciplinary sanction should be imposed, or whether a trial is necessary. The judge prescribes the prosecution of acts against local residents in a military court only when it comes to non-compliance with military discipline or a threat to the security of the troops. This applies, for example, to serious offenses on the basis of sexual promiscuity, a predisposition to crime, or to signs that testify to the savagery of the troops. Strictly condemned are criminal acts that result in the wanton destruction of locations, as well as stores or other spoils of war, to the detriment of their troops.
[...]
By order of the Chief of the Supreme
command of the Wehrmacht signed Keitel
Text 30
Instruction of the State Secretary of the Ministry of Food Herbert Backe to the district leaders of agriculture dated June 1, 1941 on the behavior towards the Russians in the occupied territory.
La V. No. 52/41 Kdos Secret!
12 requirements
to the behavior of the Germans in the East and the treatment of the Russians. [...]
Don't talk, act. You will never “talk” Russians and not convince them with speeches. He can speak better than you, since he is a born dialectician and has inherited "philosophizing." In conversations and debates, you will be the loser. You should act. The Russian is impressed only by the action, because he himself is effeminate and sentimental.
[...] The Russians only want to be a controlled mass. Such an effect will be exerted on them by the coming of the Germans, for thereby their own wish: "Come and rule over us." Therefore, the Russian should not get the impression that you hesitate. You must be a man of action, a man of action who, without debate, without long useless conversations and without philosophizing, determines what needs to be done and gives clear orders. Then the Russian will obediently serve you. Do not approach with German standards and customs, forget everything German except Germany itself. [...]
Need, hunger, contentment with little has been the fate of the Russian people for centuries. His stomach is distended, so no false sympathy. Do not try to impose the German standard of living and change the Russian way of life.
Rely completely on yourself, so no complaints or requests for help from superiors. Help yourself, and God help you!
Text 31
Order of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht dated 6/6/1941 regarding the treatment of political commissars of the Soviet Army.
The order (“Order on Commissars”) was signed by the head of the Wehrmacht high command, Field Marshal Keitel.
Annex to VKV / V Det. L 4 / Ku No. 44822 / 41, city of Chef.
Basic Directives for the Treatment of Political Commissars.
In the fight against Bolshevism, it is impossible to build relations with the enemy on the principles of humanism and international law. It is precisely from political commissars of every rank, as carriers of resistance, that one should expect hatred, cruel and inhuman treatment of our prisoners.
Troops must be aware of the following:
1) In this war, mercy and respect for international legal norms in relation to these elements are inappropriate. They are a threat to our security and to the rapid pacification of the occupied areas.
2) The political commissars are the initiators of the barbaric Asian methods of struggle. Therefore, they must be fought without condescension, with all ruthlessness. Therefore, they, captured in battle or in resistance, must be dealt with by using weapons.
For the rest, you need to do the following: [...]
2) Political commissars, as members of the organs of the enemy troops, have a special distinction - a red star with an embroidered hammer and sickle on their sleeves (for details, see the "Armed Forces of the USSR" of the department of foreign armies dated January 15, 1941 in Appendix 9e). They should be followed immediately, i.e. still on the battlefield to separate from other prisoners of war. This is necessary to deprive them of any possibility of influencing captured soldiers. These commissars are not considered soldiers; they are not covered by international legal protection in relation to prisoners of war. After separation from prisoners of war, they should be destroyed. [...]
34 Plan of the German Wehrmacht attack on the Soviet Union, June 1941.
Text 32
An excerpt from the diary of the Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels dated 16.6.1941 regarding the attack on the Soviet Union.
The Fuhrer believes that the action will last approximately 4 months, I believe less. Bolshevism will collapse like a house of cards. We are facing an unprecedented victorious campaign. We need to act. [...] Cooperation with Russia was actually a stain on our honor. Now it will be washed away. What we have been fighting against all our lives will now be destroyed. I say this to the Fuhrer, and he agrees with me completely. I must say a good word about Rosenberg, whose life's work, thanks to this action, is again justified. The Führer says: Whether we are right or wrong, we must win. This is the only way. And it is correct, moral and necessary. And if we win, then who will ask us about the methods. There are so many things on our conscience that we must win, otherwise all our people and we, at the head of everything that is dear to us, will be destroyed. So, to business! [...]
35 Wilhelm Keitel (1882-1946), photo 1939 Born in Helmscherode (Harz). In military service since 1901. During the First World War - an artillery and general staff officer. In 1934 he was awarded the rank of Major General. In 1935, head of the Wehrmacht department in the Imperial War Ministry. In 1936 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general. In 1937 he became a general of artillery. In 1938 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General, in 1940 - Field Marshal General. As Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht (since February 1938), he was responsible for developing Hitler's instructions for the conduct of the war (for example, the "Order on Commissars") and for monitoring its implementation, as well as for monitoring military planning. On May 8, 1945, he signed the act of unconditional surrender. 1. 10. 1946 sentenced to death by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Executed 10/16/1946
36 Walther von Brauchitsch (1881-1948), photo 1941. Born in Berlin. In 1900 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant. During the First World War, he held various positions in the general staff of the Western Front. After the war, an officer of the Reichswehr headquarters. In 1931 he was promoted to the rank of Major General, in 1933 - Lieutenant General, in 1936 - General of Artillery. In 1938 he received the rank of colonel general and was appointed commander in chief of the ground forces. In July 1940 he became Field Marshal General. After the defeat near Moscow in December 1941, he was removed from his post. At the end of the war he was in English captivity. On 10/18/1948 he died in an English military hospital in Hamburg-Barmbek.
37 Franz Halder (1884-1972), photo 1939. Born in Würzburg. Service in the army (artillery) since 1902, in 1904 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant. During the First World War he served in the General Staff, then in the Reichswehr and the Ministry of the Reichswehr. In 1934 he was promoted to the rank of Major General, in 1936 - Lieutenant General, in 1938 - General of Artillery. In September 1938 he became chief of the general staff of the ground forces. In 1940 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General. After conflicts with Hitler on tactical issues in September 1942, he was dismissed and transferred to the command reserve; in January 1945 he finally retired from military service. In 1938 he had contacts with the circles of the Resistance, but without active participation. After the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, the Gestapo kept him under house arrest for some time at Prinz-Albrecht-Straße 8. He was released by the Americans from the Dachau concentration camp. Died 2. 4. 1972 in Aschau / Chiemgau.
38 Fedor von Bock (1880-1945), photo 1940 Born in Kustrin. In 1898 he became an officer. From 1912 to 1919 - an officer of the General Staff. In 1916 he was awarded the rank of major. He was awarded the Order "Pour-le-Merit" ("For Merit"). After the First World War he served in the War Department. In 1931 he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general. From 1935 to 1938, as an infantry general, he was commander-in-chief of the 3rd corps of troops in Dresden. In the spring of 1938 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the 8th Army in Austria. During the attack on Poland - the commander-in-chief of the Nord group of troops, during the attack on France in 1940 - by the group of troops B. He was awarded the rank of Field Marshal. In the war against the Soviet Union, he was first commander-in-chief of the Center group of troops, from January 1942 until his replacement in July - of the Süd group of troops. Died 3.5.1945 during an air raid.
Wilhelm von Leeb (1876-1956), photo 1940 Born in Landsberg am Lech. In 1895 he joined the Bavarian army. During the First World War - an officer of the General Staff. In 1919 he became a member of the volunteer corps. After the war he served in the Ministry of the Reichswehr and in the Reichswehr. In 1929 he was promoted to the rank of Major General, in 1930 - Lieutenant General, in 1934 - General of Artillery. In March 1938, he was dismissed with the rank of colonel general, again called to serve during the occupation of the Sudetenland. In 1939 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Ts group of troops. In 1940 he became field marshal general. After the attack on the Soviet Union - Commander-in-Chief of the Nord group of troops. In January 1942 he was again dismissed. On May 2, 1945, he was in American captivity. On October 22, 1948, he was sentenced to three years in prison, taking into account the time spent in captivity. Died April 29, 1956 in Füssen.
40 Carl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt (1875-1953), photo 1939 Born in Aschersleben. Since 1892 - in the army. During the First World War - an officer of the General Staff. In 1927 was awarded the rank of major general, in 1929 - lieutenant general, in 1932 - general of infantry, in 1938 - colonel general. In November 1938 he was dismissed, in the summer of 1939 he was again drafted into the army. During the invasion of Poland - the commander-in-chief of the Süd group of troops, in France - the A group of troops, in the Soviet Union - the Süd group of troops. In November 1941 he was fired. In March 1942 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Western Group of Forces West. From the summer of 1944, he led the "court of honor" of the Wehrmacht. After the end of the war, he was in American and English captivity, on May 5, 1949 he was released for health reasons. Died 24.2.1953 in Hannover.
41 Erich Hoepner (1886-1944) - no date. Born in Frankfurt an der Oder. Since 1905 - in the army. During the First World War he was an officer. In 1933 he was appointed chief of the general staff in the 1st military district of Koenigsberg. In 1938 he was appointed commander of the 16th army (tank) corps. He took part in campaigns in Poland and France. In 1940 he was awarded the rank of Colonel General. He was the commander-in-chief of tank group 4 (from January 1942 - the 4th tank army) as part of the Nord group of forces, and from October 1941 as part of the Center group of forces. After an unauthorized order to retreat near Moscow in January 1942, he was fired from the Wehrmacht. He had connections with the military Resistance. After the assassination attempt on Hitler on July 20, 1944, he was arrested. On August 8, 1944, he was sentenced to death and hanged.
42 Walther von Reichenau (1884-1942), photo 1942. Born in Karlsruhe. Since 1903 - in the army. During the First World War - an officer of the General Staff. In 1933 he was appointed chief of the ministerial department (since February 1934 - Wehrmacht department) in the Reichswehr ministry. In 1934 he was promoted to the rank of Major General, in 1935 - Lieutenant General, in 1936 - General of Artillery. Upon entering Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and during the attack on Poland in September of the same year, he was commander-in-chief of the 10th Army. In October 1939 he became a colonel general. Then he was commander of the 6th Army in Group of Forces B. In July 1940, he was awarded the rank of Field Marshal. He entered the territory of the Soviet Union with the 6th Army as part of the Süd group of troops, in December 1941 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Süd group of troops. He died suddenly on January 17, 1942 near Poltava.
43 Hermann Hoth (1885-1971), photo 1941. Born in Neuruppin. Since 1904 - in the army. In 1934 he was awarded the rank of major general, in 1936 - lieutenant general, in 1938 - general of infantry. As commander of the 15th Army Corps (in 1940 expanded to the 3rd Panzer Group), he participated in the war against Poland and France, as well as in the attack on the Soviet Union. In October 1941 he was appointed commander-in-chief of the 17th Army, in June 1942 - of the 4th Tank Army. After the surrender of Kyiv in December 1942, he was removed from his post. In April 1945 he became commander in Erzgebirge. At the Nuremberg trials against the high command of the Wehrmacht, he was sentenced to 15 years in prison, in 1954 he was pardoned and released from prison. Died 25.1. 1971 in Goslar
44 Discussion of the situation and issuance of orders in one of the German units immediately before the attack on 22.6.1941.
45 Appendix No. 2 to the instructions for deployment and combat operations according to the "Plan Barbarossa" for Panzer Group 4 (General Hoepner) dated May 2, 1941, regarding the nature of the war. “The war against Russia is one of the most important stages in the struggle for the existence of the German people. This is the ancient battle of the Germans against the Slavs, the defense of European culture from the Muscovite-Asiatic invasion, the defense against Jewish Bolshevism. The purpose of this war is the defeat of today's Russia, so it must be waged with unprecedented cruelty. Each combat operation, both in planning and in its conduct, must be carried out with an unbending will for the merciless total extermination of the enemy. In particular, no mercy towards the representatives of the Russian-Bolshevik system.”
Forward
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War with Nazi Germany- one of the most tragic periods in the history of our country and the whole world. Hitler's strategy to seize and enslave peoples gave different results in the countries of Europe, and the war on the territory of the Soviet Union turned out to be completely different from what the fascist invaders imagined it to be, even at its first stage. Everyone who is familiar with should be able to describe the Barbarossa plan briefly, know why it got such a name, as well as the reasons for the failure of the plan.
In contact with
Blitzkrieg
So what was Barbarossa's plan? Its other name is blitzkrieg, "lightning war". The attack on the USSR, planned for June 22, 1941, was supposed to be sudden and quick.
To confuse the enemy and deprive him of the possibility of protection, the attack was planned simultaneously on all fronts: first the air force, then in several directions on the ground. Having quickly defeated the enemy, the fascist army was to head for Moscow and completely subjugate the country within two months.
Important! Do you know why the plan is named that way? Barbarossa, Frederick I of Hohenstaufen, King of Germany and Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the legendary ruler, became a classic of medieval military art.
Why was Hitler so confident in the success of the operation? He considered the Red Army weak and ill-prepared. German technology, according to his information, won both in quantitative and qualitative composition. In addition, the "blitzkrieg" has already become proven strategy, thanks to which many European countries recognized their defeat in the shortest possible time, and the map of the occupied territories was constantly replenished.
The essence of the plan was simple. The gradual capture of our country was to take place as follows:
- Attack the USSR in the border zone. The main attack was planned on the territory of Belarus, where the main forces were concentrated. Open the way for traffic to Moscow.
- Depriving the enemy of the opportunity to resist, move towards Ukraine, where the main goal was Kyiv and the sea routes. If the operation is successful, Russia will be cut off from the Dnieper, and the path to the southern regions of the country will open.
- In parallel, send armed forces to Murmansk from the countries of Northern Europe. Thus opened the way to the northern capital - Leningrad.
- Continue the offensive from the north and west, advancing towards Moscow without meeting sufficient resistance.
- Capture Moscow within 2 months.
These were the main steps of Operation Barbarossa, and the German command was confident in its success. Why did she fail?
The essence of the Barbarossa plan
Operation progress
The lightning attack on the Soviet Union, which is called Barbarossa, was launched on June 22, 1941 at about 4 am in several directions.
Start of the invasion
After a sudden artillery attack, the effect of which was achieved - the population of the country and troops were taken by surprise- launched a front of attack on the border areas with a length of 3000 kilometers.
- Northern direction - tank groups were advancing on the North-Western Front in the direction of Leningrad and Lithuania. In a few days, the Germans occupied the Western Dvina, Libau, Riga, Vilnius.
- Central - the offensive on the Western Front, the attack on Grodno, Brest, Vitebsk, Polotsk. In this direction, during the beginning of the invasion, Soviet troops could not hold back the attack, but held the line much longer than it was supposed according to the plan of "blitzkrieg".
- South - attack by air force and navy. As a result of the attack, Berdichev, Zhytomyr, and Prut were captured. Fascist troops managed to reach the Dniester.
Important! The Germans considered the first phase of Operation Barbarossa successful: they managed to surprise the enemy and deprive him of his main military forces. Many cities held out longer than expected, but, according to forecasts, no serious obstacles to the capture of Moscow were foreseen in the future.
The first part of the German plan was successful
Offensive
The German offensive against the Soviet Union continued on several fronts and continued throughout July and August 1941.
- North direction. During July, the German offensive continued, the goal of which was Leningrad and Tallinn. In connection with the counterattacks, the movement inland was slower than planned, and only by August did the Germans approach the Narva River and then the Gulf of Finland. On August 19, Novgorod was captured, but the Nazis were stopped near the Voronka River for almost a week. Then the opponents nevertheless went to the Neva, and a series of attacks on Leningrad began. The war ceased to be lightning fast, the northern capital could not be subdued from the first attack. With the advent of autumn, one of the most difficult and difficult periods of the war begins - the blockade of Leningrad.
- Central direction. This is a movement to capture Moscow, which also did not go as expected. It took the German troops a month to reach Smolensk. Also, for a whole month, battles were fought for Velikiye Luki. When trying to take Bobruisk most of divisions was attacked by Soviet soldiers. Thus, the movement of the Center group from the offensive was forced to turn into a defensive one, and Moscow turned out to be not so easy prey. The capture of Gomel was a major victory for the fascist army in this direction, and the movement towards Moscow was continued.
- Southern. The first major victory in this direction was the capture of Chisinau, but then the siege of Odessa followed for more than two months. Kyiv was not taken, which meant the failure of the movement to the south. The "Center" armies were forced to provide assistance, and as a result of the interaction of the two armies, the Crimea was cut off from the rest of the territory, and Ukraine, on the eastern side of the Dnieper, was in the hands of the Germans. Odessa surrendered in mid-October. By the beginning of November, the Crimea was completely occupied by the fascist invaders, and Sevastopol was cut off from the rest of the world.
Important! Barbarossa was brought to life, but it was very difficult to call what was happening a "blitzkrieg". Soviet cities did not give up without a long, exhausting defense on both sides or repulsed an offensive. According to the plan of the German command, Moscow was to fall before the end of August. But in fact, by mid-November, the German troops had not yet even managed to approach the capital. A harsh Russian winter was approaching...
The German offensive against the Soviet Union continued in several directions
The failure of the operation
Already at the end of July, it became clear that the Barbarossa plan would not be able to be briefly implemented, the deadlines that were given for its implementation had long passed. Only in the northern direction, the real offensive almost did not differ from the plan, while in the central and southern directions there were delays, operations unfolded much slower than planned by the German command.
As a result of such a slow advance inland, at the end of July, Hitler changed the plan: not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea and blocking communication with the Caucasus in the near future became the goal of the German army.
It was not possible to capture Moscow, the situation of which was very difficult, within 2 months, as planned. Autumn has come. Weather conditions and the serious resistance of the Soviet army caused the failure of the Barbarossa plan and the plight of the German army on the eve of winter. The movement to Moscow was stopped.
The serious resistance of the Soviet army is one of the reasons for the failure of the plan
Reasons for failure
The German command could not even imagine that such a well-thought-out Barbarossa plan, which gave excellent results in European countries, could not be implemented in the Soviet Union. The cities offered heroic resistance. It took a little more than a day for Germany to take France. And about the same amount - to move from one street to another in a besieged Soviet city.
Why did Hitler's Barbarossa plan fail?
- The level of training of the Soviet army actually turned out to be much better than the German command assumed. Yes, the quality of technology and its novelty were inferior, but ability to fight, competently distribute forces, to think over a strategy - this, of course, paid off.
- Excellent awareness. Due to the heroic work of the intelligence officers, the Soviet command knew or could predict every step of the German army. Thanks to this, it was possible to give a worthy "response" to the attacks and attacks of the enemy.
- natural and weather conditions. Barbarossa's plan was supposed to be implemented during the favorable summer months. But the operation was delayed, and the weather began to play into the hands of the Soviet soldiers. Impenetrable, wooded and mountainous territories, inclement weather, and then severe cold - all this disoriented the German army, while the Soviet soldiers perfectly fought under familiar conditions.
- Loss of control over the course of the war. If at first all the actions of the fascist army were offensive, then after a short period they turned into defensive ones, and the German command was no longer able to control events.
Thus, the incarnation of Barbarossa in the USSR met with serious obstacles, and the operation was not carried out. Moscow was not taken within 2 months, as planned. The "lightning war" brought the Soviet army out of the rut only for a short time, after which the offensive movement of the Germans was stopped. Russian soldiers fought on their native land who was well known. Cold, slush, mud, winds, downpours - all this was familiar to the defenders, but created significant obstacles for the German army.
Plan "Barbarossa"
What is the Barbarossa Plan? History Lessons. Questions for the exam. StarMedia
Output
The attack on our country was planned on three fronts and was supposed to be quick, swift and unexpected. However, unlike many European countries, such tactics did not take the Soviet command by surprise and were honorably repulsed. Operation Barbarossa failed. Brest, Odessa, Leningrad are cities that have shown by their example the power and indestructibility of the Soviet Union - a country that is not afraid of lightning attacks and knows how to put up worthy resistance.
On August 1, 1940, Erich Marx presented the first version of the war plan against the USSR. This option was based on the idea of a quick, blitzkrieg war, as a result of which the German troops were planned to reach the Rostov-Gorky-Arkhangelsk line, and later to the Urals. The decisive importance was given to the capture of Moscow. Erich Marx proceeded from the fact that Moscow is "the heart of Soviet military-political and economic power, its capture will lead to an end to Soviet resistance."
According to this plan, two strikes were envisaged - north and south of Polissya. The northern blow was planned as the main one. It was supposed to be applied between Brest-Litovsk and Gumbinen through the Baltic states and Belarus in the direction of Moscow. The southern strike was planned to be carried out from the southeastern part of Poland in the direction of Kyiv. In addition to these strikes, a "private operation to seize the Baku region" was planned. The implementation of the plan was given from 9 to 17 weeks.
Erich Marx's plan was played out at the headquarters of the supreme command under the leadership of General Paulus. This test revealed a serious drawback of the presented option: it ignored the possibility of strong flank counterattacks by Soviet troops from the north and south, capable of disrupting the advance of the main grouping towards Moscow. The headquarters of the supreme command decided to revise the plan.
In connection with Keitel's report about the poor engineering preparation of the bridgehead for an attack on the USSR, the Nazi command on August 9, 1940 issued an order called "Aufbau Ost". It outlined measures for the preparation of a theater of military operations against the USSR, the repair and construction of railways and highways, bridges, barracks, hospitals, airfields, warehouses, etc. The transfer of troops was carried out more and more intensively. On September 6, 1940, Jodl issued an order stating: “I order to increase the number of occupation troops in the east during the following weeks. For security reasons, the impression should not be created in Russia that Germany is preparing for an offensive in an easterly direction.
On December 5, 1940, at the next secret military conference, Halder's report was heard on the Otto plan, as the war plan against the USSR was originally called, and on the results of staff exercises. In accordance with the results of the exercises, it was planned to destroy the flank groups of the Red Army before the capture of Moscow by developing an offensive against Kyiv and Leningrad. In this form, the plan was approved. There were no doubts about its implementation. Supported by all those present, Hitler declared: “It is to be expected that the Russian army, at the first blow of the German troops, will suffer an even greater defeat than the army of France in 1940.”3 Hitler demanded that the war plan provide for the complete destruction of all combat-ready forces on Soviet territory.
The participants in the meeting had no doubt that the war against the USSR would be completed quickly; CPOK~ weeks was also indicated. Therefore, it was planned to provide only a fifth of the personnel with winter uniforms, Hitler's General Guderian admits in his memoirs published after the war: was provided only for every fifth soldier. German generals later tried to shift the blame for the unpreparedness of the troops of the winter campaign to Hitler. But Guderian does not hide the fact that the generals were also to blame for this. He writes: "I cannot agree with the widespread opinion that only Hitler is to blame for the lack of winter uniforms in the autumn of 1941."4
Hitler expressed not only his own opinion, but also the opinion of the German imperialists and the generals, when he, with his characteristic self-confidence, said in a circle of close associates: “I will not make such a mistake as Napoleon; when I go to Moscow, I will set out early enough to reach it before winter."
The next day after the meeting, December 6, Jodl instructed General Warlimont to draw up a directive for war against the USSR on the basis of the decisions taken at the meetings. Six days later, Warlimont submitted directive No. 21 to yodel, who made several corrections, and on December 17 it was handed over to Hitler for his signature. The next day, the directive was approved under the name Operation Barbarossa.
At a meeting with Hitler in April 1941, the German ambassador in Moscow, Count von Schulenburg, tried to express his doubts about the reality of the plan, the war against the USSR. BUT he only achieved that he fell into disfavor forever.
The fascist German generals worked out and put into effect a plan of war against the USSR, which corresponded to the most predatory desires of the imperialists. The military leaders of Germany unanimously spoke in favor of the implementation of this plan. Only after the defeat of Germany in the war against the USSR, the beaten fascist commanders for self-rehabilitation put forward a false version that they objected to an attack on the USSR, but Hitler, despite the opposition he received, nevertheless unleashed a war in the East. Thus, for example, the West German general Btomentritt, a former active Nazi, writes that Rundstedt, Brauchitsch, and Halder tried to dissuade Hitler from going to war with Russia. “But all this did not bring any results. Hitler insisted. With a firm hand, he took the helm and led Germany to the rocks of complete defeat. In reality, not only the "Fuhrer", but the entire German generals believed in the "blitzkrieg", in the possibility of a quick victory over the USSR.
Directive No. 21 said: “The German armed forces must be ready to defeat Soviet Russia through a fleeting military operation even before the end of the war with England” - the main idea of the war plan was defined in the directive as follows: “The military masses of the Russian army located in the western part of Russia armies must be destroyed in bold operations with deep advances of armored units. The retreat of combat-ready units into the expanses of Russian territory should be prevented ... The ultimate goal of the operation is to fence off the common line Arkhangelsk-Volga from Asian Russia.
On January 31, 1941, the Headquarters of the High Command of the German Ground Forces issued a "Directive on the Concentration of Troops", which set out the general plan of the command, determined the tasks of army groups, and also gave instructions on the deployment of headquarters, demarcation lines, interaction with the fleet and aviation, etc. This directive, defining the "first intention" of the German army, set before it the task of "splitting the front of the main forces of the Russian army, concentrated in the western part of Russia, with quick and deep blows from powerful mobile groups north and south of the Pripyat swamps and, using this breakthrough, destroy the disunited groups of enemy troops.
Thus, two main directions for the offensive of the German troops were outlined: south and north of Polesie. To the north of Polissya, the main blow was delivered by two army groups: "Center" and "North". Their task was defined as follows: “To the north of the Pripyat swamps, Army Group Center is advancing under the command of Field Marshal von Bock. Having introduced powerful tank formations into battle, she makes a breakthrough from the Warsaw and Suwalki area in the direction of Smolensk; then turns the tank troops to the north and destroys, together with the Finnish army and the German troops thrown up for this from Norway, completely deprives the enemy of the last defensive possibilities in the northern part of Russia. As a result of these operations, freedom of maneuver will be ensured for the implementation of subsequent tasks in cooperation with the German troops advancing in southern Russia.
In the event of a sudden and complete defeat of the Russian forces in the north of Russia, the turn of troops to the north is no longer possible and the question of an immediate strike on Moscow may arise.
To the south of Polesye, it was planned to launch an offensive by the forces of Army Group South. Its task was defined as follows: “South of the Pripyat marshes, Army Group South under the command of Field Marshal Rutsdstedt, using a swift blow from powerful tank formations from the Lublin region, cuts off Soviet troops stationed in Galicia and Western Ukraine from their communications on the Dnieper, captures crossing the Dnieper River in the region of Kyiv and to the south of it thus provides freedom of maneuver for solving subsequent tasks in cooperation with troops operating to the north, or performing new tasks in southern Russia.
The most important strategic goal of the Barbarossa plan was to destroy the main forces of the Red Army concentrated in the western part of the Soviet Union and capture militarily and economically important areas. In the future, German troops in the central direction expected to quickly reach Moscow and capture it, and in the south - to occupy the Donets Basin. In terms of great importance was attached to the capture of Moscow, which, according to the plan of the German command, should have brought Germany a decisive political, military and economic success. The Hitlerite command believed that his plan of war against the USSR would be carried out with German precision.
In January 1941, each of the three army groups received a preliminary task under Directive No. 21 and an order to play a war game in order to check the expected course of battles and obtain material for the detailed development of an operational plan.
In connection with the planned German attack on Yugoslavia and Greece, the start of hostilities against the USSR was postponed for 4-5 weeks. On April 3, the high command issued an order stating: “The time for the start of Operation Barbarossa, due to the operation in the Balkans, is postponed by at least 4 weeks.” On April 30, the High Command of the German Armed Forces made a preliminary decision to attack the USSR on June 22 1941 An intensified transfer of German troops to the Soviet border began in February 1941. Tank and motorized divisions were brought up last so as not to reveal a premature attack plan.
The famous German plan "Barbarossa" can be briefly described something like this: it is Hitler's almost unrealistic strategic plan to capture Russia as the main enemy on the way to world domination.
It is worth remembering that by the time of the attack on the Soviet Union, fascist Germany, led by Adolf Hitler, had almost unhindered captured half of the European states. Only Britain and the United States offered resistance to the aggressor.
The essence and goals of Operation Barbarossa
The Soviet-German non-aggression pact, signed shortly before the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, was for Hitler nothing more than a handicap. Why? Because the Soviet Union, without assuming a possible betrayal, fulfilled the aforementioned agreement.
And the German leader thus bought time to carefully develop a strategy to capture his main enemy.
Why did Hitler recognize Russia as the biggest obstacle in the implementation of the blitzkrieg? Because the resilience of the USSR did not allow England and the United States to lose heart and, perhaps, to surrender, like many European countries.
In addition, the fall of the Soviet Union would serve as a powerful impetus to strengthen Japan's position on the world stage. And Japan and the United States had extremely tense relations. Also, the non-aggression pact allowed Germany not to launch an offensive in adverse conditions winter cold.
The preliminary strategy of the Barbarossa plan, point by point, looked something like this:
- The powerful and well-prepared army of the Reich invades Western Ukraine, defeating the main forces of the disoriented enemy with lightning speed. After several decisive battles, the German forces finish off the scattered detachments of the surviving Soviet soldiers.
- From the territory of the occupied Balkans, march victoriously to Moscow and Leningrad. Capture both archival cities to achieve the intended result of the city. The task of capturing Moscow as the political and tactical center of the country was especially highlighted. Interesting: the Germans were sure that Moscow would flock to defend every single remnant of the USSR army - and it would be easier than ever to utterly smash them.
Why was the German plan of attack on the USSR called the "Barbarossa" plan?
The strategic plan for the lightning-fast capture and subjugation of the Soviet Union got its name in honor of Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, who ruled the Holy Roman Empire in the 12th century.
The aforementioned leader went down in history thanks to his numerous and successful conquests.
In the name of the plan "Barbarossa", there was undoubtedly a symbolism inherent in almost all actions and decisions of the leadership of the Third Reich. The name of the plan was approved on January 31, 1941.
Hitler's goals in World War II
Like any totalitarian dictator, Hitler did not pursue any special tasks (at least, those that could be explained by applying the elementary logic of a sound mind).
The Third Reich unleashed the Second world war with the only goal: to seize the world, to establish domination, to subjugate all countries and peoples to their perverted ideologies, to impose their picture of the world on the entire population of the planet.
How long did Hitler want to take over the USSR
In general, the Nazi strategists allotted only five months for the capture of the vast territory of the Soviet Union - a single summer.
Today, such arrogance may seem unfounded, if you do not remember that at the time of the development of the plan, the German army in just a few months, without much effort and loss, captured almost all of Europe.
What does blitzkrieg mean and what are its tactics
Blitzkrieg, or the tactics of lightning-fast capture of the enemy, is the brainchild of German military strategists at the beginning of the 20th century. The word Blitzkrieg comes from two German words: Blitz (lightning) and Krieg (war).
The blitzkrieg strategy was based on the possibility of capturing vast territories in a record short time(months or even weeks) before the opposing army comes to its senses and mobilizes the main forces.
The tactic of a lightning attack was based on the closest interaction between the infantry, aviation and tank formations of the German army. Tank crews, supported by infantry, must break through behind enemy lines and surround the main fortified positions important for establishing permanent control over the territory.
The enemy army, being cut off from all communication systems and all kinds of supplies, quickly begins to experience difficulties in solving the simplest issues (water, food, ammunition, clothing, etc.). Thus weakened, the forces of the attacked country are soon surrendered or destroyed.
When did Nazi Germany attack the USSR?
According to the results of the development of the Barbarossa plan, the Reich attack on the USSR was scheduled for May 15, 1941. The date of the invasion was shifted due to the Nazis carrying out the Greek and Yugoslav operations in the Balkans.
In fact, Nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union without declaring war on June 22, 1941 at 4:00 am. This sad date is considered the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
Where did the Germans go during the war - map
Blitzkrieg tactics helped the German troops in the first days and weeks of the Second World War to cover vast distances across the territory of the USSR without any special problems. In 1942, a rather impressive part of the country was captured by the Nazis.
German forces reached almost Moscow. In the Caucasus, they advanced to the Volga, but after the battle of Stalingrad they were driven back to Kursk. At this stage, the retreat of the German army began. The invaders passed through the northern lands to Arkhangelsk.
Reasons for the failure of the Barbarossa plan
If we consider the situation globally, the plan fell through due to the inaccuracy of German intelligence data. Wilhelm Canaris, who led it, may well have been a British double agent, as some historians today argue.
If we take these unconfirmed data on faith, it becomes clear why he “fed” Hitler the misinformation that the USSR had practically no secondary lines of defense, but there were huge supply problems, and, moreover, almost all troops were stationed on the border.
Conclusion
Many historians, poets, writers, as well as eyewitnesses of the events described, admit that a huge, almost decisive role in the victory of the USSR over Nazi Germany was played by the fighting spirit of the Soviet people, the freedom-loving Slavic and other peoples who did not want to drag out a miserable existence under the yoke of world tyranny.
