In accordance with the Geneva Agreements on a political settlement, on May 15, 1988, the USSR began withdrawing its military contingent from Afghanistan. The process was designed to last 9 months.
I submitted my first report on transfer to Afghanistan six months after being drafted into the army. On my chest I wore the badge of a 3rd class specialist, and on each shoulder strap there were two “snot” (badges) of a junior sergeant. An additional bonus was the knowledge of the Tajik language, almost identical to Dari, which was spoken by almost half of the population of Afghanistan. Only the pronunciation was different.
All this, in my deep conviction, allowed me to hope for a positive decision, so I entered the company office, almost without worry. Having reported as expected, he handed the piece of paper with his report to the company commander. He tiredly rubbed his eyes, first glanced at him, then read more carefully. After a long pause, he turned his eyes to me, and his head began to shake finely.
This was a bad sign. Our major had already been “beyond the river” and returned from there with a military medal, which included a shell shock. Everyone in the regiment knew that when a company commander was nervous, he began to develop a tic.
“So you’re going to war, sergeant? What do you know about it?” - He asked, sighing heavily and adding something uncensored in a low voice.
Judging by the intonation, I realized that the question was rhetorical, and decided to follow the precepts of Peter I, taking on “a dashing and stupid appearance.”
The major was not impressed by my acting efforts, and his next sigh was even deeper and heavier, and even more obscene.
“Understand, son, war consists of only five percent of exploits and glory, everything else is pain, blood, dirt and death! Therefore, here is my answer to you, believe me, someday later you will thank me for this,” he growled he, tearing my report to shreds.
Goodbye, Afghan, this ghostly world
I realized the truth of the company commander’s words when my neighbor Vanya returned from Afghanistan. Friends who didn’t smell war thought it best to celebrate his demobilization with a trip to the Varzob Gorge, a favorite countryside vacation spot for Dushanbe residents.
We walked along a mountain path in search of a convenient place for a picnic, and I noticed Vanka’s gait. He walked, carefully choosing the place for each next step, bending slightly, constantly turning his head in all directions. And when spring thunder suddenly rumbled in the sky, he somehow deftly tumbled over the nearest boulder, snatching a non-existent machine gun from behind his back.
That evening, Vanka, previously indifferent to alcohol, got completely drunk, and at night shouted: “Perfume!” - rushed out of the tent to go outside. The picnic was hopelessly ruined. In the morning I took him home, fortunately he was across the fence from mine, and handed him over to my grandfather. Ivan lived in the neighborhood for several more years and left for Russia as soon as he buried his grandfather. But during all this time, he never spoke about his time spent in Afghanistan.
In the same way, my friend Ato did not like questions about the army. We only knew that he served in the “musbat” (“Muslim battalion” - GRU special forces, formed from representatives of the peoples of Central Asia) and participated in the storming of the Taj Beg Palace, the residence of the then ruler of the DRA, Hafizullo Amin. They came in the second wave, after the KGB special groups “Grom” and “Zenith”, but we heard nothing from him except the grinding of teeth about the details of that attack.
We are no longer destined to return to Afghanistan
I still visited the other side of Pyanj, although after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, for the first time in the late 90s.
The “visit” was completely illegal and only 40 kilometers deep into the adjacent territory, as it was carried out accompanied by guys from the OGSR (a separate special reconnaissance group, special forces of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia). I cannot reveal the details, the operation is still classified, I will only say that it took place without a single shot being fired, and this is the main criterion for success for such units.
A couple of years later, I arrived in Afghanistan officially, with a visa stamp in my passport and a travel document in my pocket. The purpose of the trip was an interview with the Lion of Panjshir - the famous Afghan military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. The most combat-ready Soviet army at that time was unable to capture his small homeland, the Panjshir Gorge, even after conducting a large-scale operation.
They say that the Taliban, after seizing power in Kabul, took control of all the main routes leading to Panjshir and sent their negotiators to Masood. They offered him to surrender with honor, saying that almost the entire country was under their control, all communications were cut and his troops would not survive the blockade. Ahmad Shah, taking off his pakul (national felt headdress), threw it to the ground with the words: “As long as we have at least such a piece of our homeland left, we will continue to fight!”
I found the commander-in-chief of the Northern Alliance in the village of Khoja-Bahauddin - one of his temporary residences. Despite being very busy, Masud received me with interest; after all, we were fellow tribesmen and spoke the same language, and agreed to give me an interview that same evening. The conversation lasted more than an hour. In the end, I asked him about the past war with the shuravi, as the Afghans called the Soviet soldiers.
“The Shuravi were worthy opponents. Not because they fought bravely. There was blood between us, but they didn’t need our land. They didn’t come to conquer us, but to change us. Lately, sometimes it seems to me that it would have been better for them to succeed.” “,” he answered after a long pause.
Many Afghans who witnessed that war also treat the shuravi with respect. Young people, for the most part, look at all foreigners, without exception, with suspicion and hostility. But middle-aged people remember how citizens of the USSR built houses for them, built plants and factories, treated children and adults. They do not expect such an attitude from current foreign “benefactors”.
The enemy we haven't finished off
30 years after the beginning of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the fire of war in this long-suffering war has not died down, but, on the contrary, has flared up even stronger.
NATO took the place of the USSR, but during the 16 years of its stay here, the coalition did not achieve any significant successes. Increasingly, words are heard from the highest floors of the Capitol that the situation with the US military presence in Afghanistan has reached a dead end. The head of the US Senate Armed Services Committee, John McCain, believes that Washington is losing the war.
But the White House, with tenacity worthy of better use, continues to try to put out the fire with gasoline, increasing the number of its military contingent. American generals consider this a universal recipe for achieving victory. We all know what this leads to.
The war in Afghanistan has turned from a liberation war into a terrorist war, and the country itself has become a springboard where extremists of all stripes flock from all over the world. Every day there are reports of terrorist attacks in which both military and civilians are killed.
After the Soviet army left Afghanistan, the local government lasted three years and was overthrown only after Moscow stopped supporting Kabul with arms and ammunition. Western experts are confident that if US President Donald Trump now decides to withdraw coalition troops, then the government of Ashraf Ghani will face the same fate, only much faster.
Third toast, even the wind on the slopes died down
On the battlefields in Afghanistan, according to official data, about 15 thousand residents of Tajikistan gave up their international duty, 366 of them returned “as a cargo of 200” on board the “Black Tulip” (an AN-12 plane that delivered the bodies of dead servicemen to the Union).
Two Tajik citizens were awarded the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union - guard senior sergeant Alexander Mironenko (posthumously) and senior lieutenant Nabi Akramov.
In Tajikistan, they always follow with great attention what is happening in the neighboring country; we have 1,400 kilometers of common border with Afghanistan and at least as many thousands of years of common culture.
And yet the geographical names Bagram, Kunduz, Panjshir, Puli-Khumri and others will resonate in the heart of every resident of the post-Soviet space born in the 60-70s of the last century. And the Tajik word “bacha” (boy, guy) generally became a universal password among internationalist soldiers.
Let's leave it to political scientists to debate whether this war was really necessary. Personally, today I want to say one thing: “Honor and glory to you, shuravi!”
On February 15, 1989, the almost ten-year stay of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan ended.
Thousands of Russian mothers were able to breathe a sigh of relief that their sons were returning home alive.
Political games are a cynical and dirty thing, but when they result in thousands of deaths, such games can confidently be called a crime.
How it all began
Due to its geographical and economic position, Afghanistan in all periods of modern history has been an attractive territory for countries seeking dominance in the Central Asian region.
Most of the world's major states, accustomed to dictating their will and imposing policies that were beneficial to them, did not need an independent and developing people's Afghanistan. During the civil war that engulfed the country after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1973, confrontation took place between nationalist and socio-political forces.
The People's Democratic Party, which came to power in 1978, not only did not stop, but aggravated the civil war. The policy of radicalism of the new Afghan government increased the resistance of the opposition forces. The opposition was openly supported by NATO member countries, Muslim countries and China. The Soviet Union led a small coalition of states supporting the legally elected government of Afghanistan.
Afghan war
After repeated requests from the Afghan government for military assistance, the Soviet Union sent a limited contingent of its troops to Afghanistan in late December 1979. The main task of the Soviet troops was the protection and defense of national economic facilities, as well as escorting convoys with cargo.
But when the question arose about an adequate response to armed attacks by opposition forces on Soviet military personnel, a limited contingent of troops found themselves drawn into hostilities. This participation in hostilities received the unofficial name “Afghan War”. The conflict turned out to be too protracted.
It placed a heavy burden on the economy of the Soviet Union, but the most terrible and irreparable losses were human losses. The “cargo of 200” regularly sent home, a large number of wounded and missing, made the “Afghan war” not only unpopular among the population, but also threatened to lead to a social explosion. Finally, sanity overcame political ambitions and the Soviet Union announced the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan in 1988.
Systematic withdrawal of troops
According to the command plan, the withdrawal was to begin in May and end on February 15, 1989. The operation to withdraw Soviet troops took place strictly according to schedule in several stages. By August 1988, half of the personnel had been withdrawn. The Mujahideen, who control more than 70% of the territory of Afghanistan, intensified hostilities, and the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent was suspended until November.
In order to reduce the losses of Soviet military personnel, missile weapons were used against the armed forces of the opposition. Until the complete withdrawal of troops, 92 launches of Luna-class tactical missiles were carried out. This saved thousands of lives of Soviet soldiers. In the abandoned territories there remained capital military camps with modern infrastructure, a large amount of equipment and weapons.
Despite the agreement reached on non-participation in hostilities with the majority of opposition leaders, the withdrawal of our troops took place under constant artillery and rocket fire. And yet, on February 15, 1989, the commander of the 40th Army, General Boris Gromov, at 15:00 Moscow time, was the last of his subordinates to cross the Friendship Bridge. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was completed strictly according to plan. The last to leave Afghanistan were the border troops, who closed the state border of the USSR.
Results
Official statistics claim that more than 600 thousand Soviet troops fought in the Afghan war. Losses amounted to about 14 thousand killed, more than 6 thousand Soviet Afghan soldiers remained disabled. Recently, Russia has been celebrating February 15 as the Day of Remembrance of Russians who performed their military duty outside the Fatherland.
On April 7, 1988, USSR Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov signed a directive that determined the procedure for the withdrawal of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Troops (LCSV) from Afghanistan and methods for ensuring security on the march. According to the document, the last army unit was supposed to leave the republic on February 15, 1989.
On the same day, April 7, 1988, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev met in Tashkent with the President of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) Mohammad Najibullah. During the negotiations, the Soviet leader persuaded his Afghan colleague to conclude a political agreement with Pakistan, which supported the armed opposition.
This document was signed on April 14, 1988 in Geneva. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors of a peaceful settlement. Islamabad committed itself not to interfere in the affairs of the DRA, and Moscow committed to withdraw its troops between May 15, 1988 and February 15, 1989.
USSR army units were to gradually leave Afghanistan and transfer security responsibilities to government forces. It is generally accepted that the Geneva document provided Moscow with the international legal basis for the full completion of the Afghan campaign.
Weakness of the regime
Since 1980, the basis of the OKSV has been the 40th Army, formed in the Turkestan Military District in December 1979. The directive on the withdrawal of troops was prepared on the basis of proposals from the leadership of this formation. One of its developers was the commander of the 40th Army, Colonel General Boris Gromov.
In his memoirs, he stated that the maximum period of stay in Afghanistan was limited to 2-3 years. This version is confirmed by many researchers. In particular, the head of the Afghanistan sector of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Viktor Korgun, believed that the negotiation process, which resulted in the Geneva agreements, was initiated in 1982 by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Yuri Andropov.
However, discussion of specific plans for the withdrawal of OKSV began only in 1985, and only in 1987 did Moscow make a final decision on such a sensitive issue.
- Shot of the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent from Afghanistan, February 1989
- Press service of the Ministry of Defense
546 thousand Soviet military personnel went through the war, which lasted 10 years, and 13.8 thousand people died in it. As Gromov notes, “our losses in Afghanistan were four times less than, say, the Americans in Vietnam, but I don’t think this makes it any easier for the mothers, widows and children of those killed.”
In his book “Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan,” Major General Alexander Lyakhovsky emphasizes that the key reason for the withdrawal of OKSV was the inability of the DRA government forces to restrain the onslaught of the Mujahideen even with tangible support from the contingent.
The weakness of Najibullah's army was explained by a lack of motivation of personnel, a lack of professional personnel, and the inability to conduct counter-propaganda work and find a common language with local authorities. Soviet officers were constantly faced with the fact that the armed forces of the DRA could not take basic measures to organize defense.
Before leaving Afghanistan, the USSR Ministry of Defense developed clear recommendations for ensuring the security of the DRA, taking into account the human and material resources that government forces had. However, most of the regulations were never implemented. In 1992, Najibullah's regime collapsed, and in 1996, the Taliban* seized power in the country.
Boris Gromov also recalled that the war in Afghanistan lost its meaning due to the inability of the army and government loyal to the USSR to consolidate the outcome of military operations. According to him, Soviet troops were forced to constantly recapture recently liberated areas. This led to increased losses among personnel and overstrain of economic resources.
“The local Afghan leadership, despite pro-Soviet sentiments, was not interested in us conducting military operations with maximum efficiency. Only a few of them in the “cleared” districts tried to consolidate their power and lead. Obviously, they understood that sooner or later the war would end, and besides them, there would be no one to hold the answer... Instead of specific decisive actions, only beautiful speeches and conversations were heard about faith in internationalism and the bright future of the Afghan homeland,” Gromov describes the situation .
- Press service of the Ministry of Defense
"International Debt"
The purpose of the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 1979 was the desire of the USSR leadership to secure the southern borders, consolidating the results of the pro-communist coup (the so-called April Revolution of 1978). The US and neighboring Pakistan opposed regime change.
Formally, OKSV fulfilled its “international duty to the Afghan people who are building socialism.” However, in general, successful international propaganda initiated by the West created the idea that the Soviet army was an occupying force that did not take into account the interests of the inhabitants of the republic.
Among the local population of the DRA, Pakistani and American intelligence spread slogans about the fight against the “infidels,” playing on Islamist sentiments. As a result, a fairly powerful partisan movement arose in Afghanistan, which kept the rear units of the OKSV in suspense.
“The Afghans greeted our first columns very warmly. Communication between Soviet Tajiks and Uzbeks with the local population began everywhere. However, already at the end of the month (January 1980), the clouds began to gather. One of the reasons for this was active anti-Soviet propaganda. In every village and small town, people were turned against us,” Gromov stated.
In addition, participants in the battles recall that enormous difficulties arose with supplying troops. The mountainous and rocky terrain did not always allow cargo to be delivered by ground transport, and helicopters could not drop cargo from a height of more than 2 km. In addition, rotorcraft became a vulnerable target with the advent of American MANPADS among the Mujahideen.
Escorting the columns required colossal efforts. To ensure their safe passage, Soviet troops had to set up outposts in the highlands. Climbing to a height of over three thousand meters was a very difficult test. The military personnel simply physically could not deliver the required amount of ammunition and ammunition to the summit.
“Each soldier, sergeant and officer went to the mountains, carrying 40-60 kg on their shoulders. With such a huge weight, and even under the scorching sun, not everyone will be able to simply climb to the top, let alone take the fight afterwards. Therefore, commanders sometimes turned a blind eye, as they say, to the fact that some soldiers left heavy equipment - bulletproof vests and helmets - in the barracks before going to the mountains,” explains Gromov.
- Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan
- Press service of the Ministry of Defense
Helicopter pilots also took great risks. Typically, the vehicle rested its front chassis against a small ledge, indicated a hover, and dropped its load onto the rocks. However, after completing the mission, the helicopter could not rise. The car actually fell down, and then gained speed and lift. This was the only way to deliver goods to the highlands.
Transport problems made it impossible for Soviet troops to organize a normal evacuation of the wounded. Most often, the unit commander chose the most resilient soldiers, who carried their comrade on a makeshift stretcher. A security group moved with them. 13-15 people could be involved in the evacuation of one wounded person.
“We literally dug into the mountains”
The Mujahideen and Pakistani special forces, who knew the surrounding area very well, took advantage of the problems experienced by the Soviet contingent. For example, remote outposts covering the movement of columns were subject to regular attacks from superior enemy forces.
The most famous episode illustrating the fierce clashes that took place in the highlands occurred on January 7, 1988. The paratroopers of the 9th company defending height 3234 were attacked by 300 dushmans. In the famous film by Fyodor Bondarchuk, all the soldiers of the unit died (with the exception of only one conscript soldier). In fact, the garrison lost 6 out of 39 people.
The defenders of the heights showed professionalism and military valor (two fighters were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously). However, the paratroopers could not have held out without reinforcements and artillery support. In reality, Soviet howitzers and multiple launch rocket systems constantly hit the Mujahideen positions.
The history of the feat of the 9th company demonstrates the high level of combat effectiveness of Soviet military personnel operating in the most difficult natural and climatic conditions. The command and soldiers of the OKSV quickly learned to competently organize defense in order to prevent the enemy from blockading the held heights.
“It was very difficult to “burrow” into the rocks. Still, they found quite original solutions that made it possible to guard the area entrusted to a platoon or company without leaving the outpost at all. We literally bit into the mountains, making full-length trenches. Having run through these passages and passages from the barracks, the soldier found himself at his firing position without ever showing himself to the enemy,” says Gromov about one of the original ways of organizing defense in the mountains.
- Monument to Soviet soldiers in the mountains of Afghanistan
- Press service of the Ministry of Defense
Nunlost war
An expert at the Center for the Study of Modern Afghanistan, Dmitry Verkhoturov, believes that Soviet soldiers successfully completed their assigned tasks in the DRA. According to him, many facts refute the widely held opinion in the West that OKSV allegedly left Afghanistan after being defeated.
“The Mujahideen, in fact, failed to do anything against the Soviet troops; the militants had successes only in battles with government forces. Therefore, there is no reason to conclude that Moscow lost that war. At the same time, it makes sense to discuss whether the Soviet troops should have been drawn so deeply into the conflict and what political mistakes were made,” Verkhoturov said in an interview with RT.
As the expert explained, the initial mission of the OKSV was to occupy strategically important facilities to support the Najibullah regime. Conducting large-scale military operations was the prerogative of government forces. The strategy changed in 1982, when Moscow realized that in order to maintain the socialist orientation of Afghanistan it was necessary to become a full-fledged participant in the war.
“It’s worth dispelling another myth - there was no occupation of Afghanistan. Government troops and officials acted completely autonomously from their Soviet patrons. True, in my opinion, this was the main mistake of the USSR. The DRA leadership did not have the resources to govern the country. In order to preserve the regime, a real occupation was required along the lines of the one that existed in East Germany in 1945-1949,” Verkhoturov said.
- Soviet troops leaving Afghanistan in armored vehicles
- Press service of the Ministry of Defense
RT's interlocutor is convinced that only more decisive actions by the USSR could be the key to maintaining a stable Afghanistan. As Verkhoturov believes, Moscow should have used its ten years in the DRA differently - to concentrate efforts on educating the military and political elite, which could then retain power in their hands.
“How could our allies manage the army if a significant part of the officers were illiterate, and politicians and officials loyal to the USSR had no idea how to develop the country. Moscow failed to do much, but it came to Afghanistan with good intentions. To understand this, it is enough to compare the period 1979-1989 with the consequences of the presence of the American contingent in the country since 2001,” Verkhoturov concluded.
28 years ago, on February 15, 1989, the last Soviet troops left the state of Afghanistan. Thus ended an almost 10-year war, in which the Soviet Union lost about 15 thousand of its citizens. Today, February 15, is both a holiday for Afghan veterans and a day of remembrance and mourning for all fallen internationalist soldiers.
According to the General Staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense, about 620 thousand Soviet troops passed through Afghanistan, of which 22,269 were Kazakhs. 15,526 people died in combat, died from wounds and diseases, of which 924 were our fellow countrymen. 333 people went missing and were captured, including 21 from the Kazakh SSR.
For heroism and courage, 86 Kazakh soldiers were awarded the title “Hero of the Soviet Union.”
Among the participants in the “Afghans” were pilots and tank crews, motorized riflemen and paratroopers, sappers and signalmen, and representatives of other branches of the military. Privates, sergeants, warrant officers and officers behaved fearlessly and decisively in extreme conditions, acting like true patriotic professionals. No one will be indifferent to the exploits of those who are able to shield the commander with their breasts in battle, to draw fire on themselves, saving their comrades.
... The war in Afghanistan began on the basis of the “List of requests from the Afghan leadership regarding the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into the DRA in 1979,” labeled “Particularly Important Document.”
In this situation, on December 12, 1979, in the office of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev, a political decision was made to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan.
The military operation to introduce troops into Afghanistan can be divided into two stages: the first - December 27-28, the second - December 29-31, 1979.
At the first stage, on December 27, the Darul Aman Palace, Kabul Radio and other important objects were stormed. Hafizullah Amin, the president of the country, was mortally wounded by a grenade during the storming of the palace; according to the official version, “the revolutionary court sentenced him to death as a traitor,” and on December 28, the situation in Kabul was completely controlled by the troops.
The second stage was that, having crossed the state border and marched, the troops encircled the most important administrative centers of the country along the Termez-Kabul-Ghazni, Kushka-Herat-Kandahar routes. Some Soviet troops were sent through Salang to Bagram, and through Kabul to Gardez. During 1980, the military contingent continued to strengthen.
Soviet troops performed the following tasks: guarded the Kushka-Herat-Shindad-Girshet-Kandahar highways; Termez-Kabul; Kabul-Jalalabad; Kunduz-Faizabad; guarded objects of economic cooperation: the Shiteran-Jarkuduk gas field, power plants in Surubi, Naglez, Kabul; guarded and ensured the functioning of the airfields of Kunduz, Faizabad, Bagram, Kabul, Kandahar, etc.; contributed to the strengthening of authorities in 21 provinces (regions); carried columns with loads; together with Afghan units, they conducted military operations against opposition forces; fought against caravans delivering weapons and ammunition from Pakistan and Iran; solved other problems at the request of the DRA leadership.
At the end of 1988 - beginning of 1989, meetings were held between representatives of the USSR and the Afghan opposition, as well as with representatives of the Pakistani and Iranian leadership and the former King of Afghanistan M. Zakir Shah about ending the war, restoring peace in the country and forming a coalition government. As part of these negotiations, the USSR confirmed that it had fully fulfilled the obligations assumed in Geneva on April 14, 1988 for a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan, which was monitored by UN observations.
It was a war. This war was not easy, and the guys who went to it honestly fulfilled their military duty.
The Afghan war is not just a historical fact, it is an unhealed wound for fathers and mothers, children of the guys who fought.
February 15, 1989 At 10:00 local time, the last Soviet soldier crossed the border separating the Soviet Union and Afghanistan on a bridge over the Amu Darya River near the small Uzbek city of Termez. This soldier was Lieutenant General B.V. Gromov, who brought up the rear of the last column of the 40th Army, thereby symbolizing completion of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan after many years of bloody war.
Having crossed an invisible line - the state border, the army commander paused and, turning towards Afghanistan, quietly but clearly uttered several phrases that do not fit on paper, and then told correspondents: “There is not a single soldier of the 40th Army left behind me.” . Thus ended the Afghan war, which began and lasted for more than 9 years. A war that claimed the lives of more than 14 thousand and maimed more than 53 thousand Soviet citizens and more than a million Afghans.
On February 7, 1980, a meeting of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee took place, where the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan was considered. The Soviet leadership spoke negatively at the meeting regarding the withdrawal of troops.
In particular, D.F. Ustinov said: “I think that it will take a year, or even a year and a half, until the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and before that we cannot even think about withdrawing troops, otherwise we can get into a lot of trouble.” L.I. Brezhnev: “I think that we even need to slightly increase the contingent of troops in Afghanistan.” A. A. Gromyko: “After some time, the troops will certainly be withdrawn from Afghanistan. It seems to me that we should think about what contractual obligations to establish between the parties after such a thing happens that it is possible to withdraw troops. We need to ensure complete security in Afghanistan.”
At the end of February 1980, again on the initiative of L. I. Brezhnev, the issue of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan was considered. It was believed that by overthrowing Kh. Amin and consolidating the new Afghan government of B. Karmal, they had completed their task.
But Yu. V. Andropov, D. F. Ustinov and, possibly, A. A. Gromyko opposed the withdrawal of troops, so they did not do this. The decision was probably influenced by the sharp escalation of the situation in Kabul at the end of February: the Soviet embassy was shelled and several of our citizens were killed. Then government forces barely managed to disperse the crowds of thousands of fanatics.
In May 1981, the USSR Ambassador to the DRA F.A. Tabeev, at a meeting of military advisers, outlined the official point of view on the prospects for the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan: “It was assumed that in a short time, no more than a year, using the army as a deterrent force, without getting involved in military operations, we will create conditions for the establishment and strengthening of a new leadership and the development of a new stage of the revolution. And then, before world public opinion has time to react negatively, we will withdraw the troops. But a year has passed and it turned out that the Afghan leadership does not have its own military support to defend the country. Therefore, now, for the next two years, the task has been set to create an Afghan army that is combat-ready and loyal to the government.”
At the beginning of 1982, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, his deputy D. Cordovez and others took an active part in resolving the Afghan problem. 12 rounds of negotiations and 41 discussions were organized with the participation of Soviet, Afghan, American and Pakistani diplomats. As a result, a package of documents on the withdrawal of troops was prepared.
In Moscow, immediately after Yu. V. Andropov came to power, these proposals were responded positively.
On May 19, 1982, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan officially confirmed the desire of the USSR and the DRA to set a date for the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops. Yu. V. Andropov was ready to present an eight-month program for the withdrawal of troops. But during that period the confrontation between the USSR and the USA intensified. Yu. V. Andropov passed away. D. Kardoves sent his project to Moscow and Washington, but received no response.
After K.U. Chernenko came to power, the negotiation process on Afghanistan was suspended, although the military more and more persistently raised the issue of troop withdrawal.
The negotiation process was resumed only in 1985 after the election of M. S. Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. In October 1985, the Politburo was tasked with speeding up the resolution of the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops. At the same time, the Afghan authorities were notified of our firm intention to withdraw their troops. B. Karmal commented on this decision: “If you leave now, next time you will have to bring in a million soldiers.”
In February 1986, at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, M. S. Gorbachev announced that a plan for the phased withdrawal of Soviet troops had been developed and would be implemented immediately after a political settlement. In May 1986, instead of B. Karmal, Najibullah (Najib) was elected to the post of General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee. B. Karmal went for “rest and treatment” in the USSR.
At a Politburo meeting on November 13, 1986, a large-scale task was set: to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan within two years (in 1987, withdraw half of the troops, and in 1988, the remaining 50%).
On April 14, 1988, with the mediation of the UN in Geneva, the foreign ministers of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed a series of documents designed to put an end to the bloodshed. The USSR and the USA acted as guarantors of the implementation of the agreements, according to which the USSR undertook to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within a nine-month period starting from May 15, 1988. During the first three months, it was planned to withdraw half of all troops.
Pakistan and the US should have stopped all interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The schedule for the withdrawal of troops on April 7, 1988 was signed by the Minister of Defense, Marshal D. T. Yazov. By this time, their number in Afghanistan was 100.3 thousand people. The withdrawal was planned to be carried out in parallel through two border points - Termez (Uzbekistan) and Kushka (Turkmenistan).
While carrying out the planned withdrawal of troops, the USSR continued to provide significant military assistance to Afghanistan. Afghan specialists were trained at an accelerated pace, and material reserves were created in key areas and at outposts. The 40th Army continued to participate in battles with the Mujahideen, and strikes were carried out against militant bases with R-300 missiles and aircraft from the territory of the Soviet Union.
The closer the start of the second stage of troop withdrawal approached, the more concerned the Afghan leadership became. In September 1988, the President of Afghanistan Najibullah, in a conversation with generals V.I. Varennikov, head of the Representative Office of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan, and B.V. Gromov,
commander of the 40th Army, attempted to delay Soviet troops in Afghanistan. The military command clearly opposed this proposal. However, this position of the Afghans was understood by some leaders of the USSR. Under their pressure, the troop withdrawal schedule was changed. The second phase of the withdrawal of troops from Kabul was supposed to begin in November 1988, but in accordance with the new directive of the Ministry of Defense, it began only on January 15, 1989.
But the matter did not stop there. In January 1989, President Najibullah, during meetings in Kabul with USSR Foreign Minister E. A. Shevardnadze and
KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov persistently asked to leave 12 thousand volunteers from the 40th Army in Afghanistan to guard the international airport in Kabul and the strategic Kabul-Hairaton highway.
E. A. Shevardnadze gave instructions to prepare proposals for the Politburo Commission of the CPSU Central Committee on Afghanistan.
General V.I. Varennikov conveyed his negative answer, despite the fact that it was proposed to establish cash payments to volunteers - officers 5 thousand rubles, and soldiers 1 thousand rubles monthly. At the same time, the military emphasized that if a decision is made, then it is necessary to leave a group of at least 30 thousand people.
Before the final decision was made, V.I. Varennikov gave the order to suspend the withdrawal of troops, since otherwise the abandoned objects would then have to be recaptured with battles and losses.
The pause lasted 10 days, until January 27, 1989. And yet, common sense prevailed. At a meeting of the Politburo Commission of the CPSU Central Committee on Afghanistan, it was decided not to leave troops, but to ensure their complete withdrawal within the established time frame.
On February 4, 1989, the last unit of the 40th Army left Kabul. In the capital, besides the Soviet embassy, only a small security force remained, the leadership of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense and the office of the chief military adviser, who already flew to their homeland on February 14.
February 15, 1989 Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from Afghanistan. The withdrawal of the troops of the 40th Army was led by the last commander of the limited contingent (OKSVA), Lieutenant General Boris Gromov. 
There is still a debate about the reasons that prompted the USSR to intervene in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, and the advisability of this step. The only thing that needs no comment is the terrible price our country has paid. About a million Soviet soldiers and officers passed through the Afghan war, which claimed the lives of almost 15 thousand Soviet citizens and disabled tens of thousands, in addition to the deaths of countless Afghan rebels and civilians.
Winners or losers?
Disputes continue over the status of the Soviet military contingent that left Afghanistan in 1989—as a winner or a loser. However, no one calls the Soviet troops the winners of the Afghan War; opinions are divided as to whether the USSR lost or did not lose this war. According to one point of view, the Soviet troops cannot be considered defeated: firstly, they were never officially tasked with a complete military victory over the enemy and control over the main territory of the country. The goal was to relatively stabilize the situation, help strengthen the Afghan government, and prevent possible external intervention. According to supporters of this position, the Soviet troops coped with these tasks, moreover, without suffering a single significant defeat.
Opponents claim that in fact, there was a goal of complete military victory and control over Afghan territory, but it could not be accomplished - guerrilla warfare tactics were used, in which final victory is almost unattainable, and the Mujahideen have always controlled the bulk of the territory. In addition, it was not possible to stabilize the position of the socialist Afghan government, which was eventually overthrown three years after the withdrawal of troops. At the same time, no one disputes that significant military losses and economic costs played a major role in the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. It was estimated that during the war the USSR annually spent 3.8 billion US dollars on Afghanistan (3 billion on the military campaign itself). The official losses of Soviet troops were 14,427 killed, more than 53 thousand wounded, more than 300 prisoners and missing. At the same time, there is an opinion that the real death toll is 26 thousand - the official reports did not take into account the wounded who died after being transported to the territory of the USSR.
However, despite all the complexity, inconsistency and political assessment of these events, it should be noted that the Soviet military personnel, military advisers and specialists who were in the DRA were faithful to their military duty to the end and fulfilled it with dignity. Eternal glory to the heroes!
